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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID LEE HEWITT, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 930035-CA 
Priority No. 3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to both 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18a-1(b) and section 78-2a-3(g)(1953 
as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Was the Appellant's writ justly dismissed under the demise 
of a waiver and being time-barred. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court should apply the "Substantial Fairness" standard 
of review and/or in the alternative apply the "Abuse of 
Discretion" standard in consideration of the issues in this case, 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appendix I of the breif contains the full text of the 
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions: 
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Constitution of Utah, Article I section 5 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 11 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 26 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 27 
U.S. Constitution Amendment V 
U.S. Constitution Amendment VI 
U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV Section I 
U.S. Constitution Article I section I (9) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18a-1(b) 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(g) 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-31.1 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-42 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-43 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 65B(b)(10) 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, rule 4-203 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, rule 4-604 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal sought by the Appellant from a decision 
rendered by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge, Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on a Writ for 
Extraordinary Relief filed with said court. The Appellant was 
sentenced to a term of 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison 
for Retail Theft on February 4, 1991 by the Honorable Judge 
Michael R. Murphy. On February 11, 1992, the Appellant did file 
a Writ for Extraordinary Relief with the Third District Court. 
On December 16, 1992, Judge Michael R. Murphy did dismissed the 
Writ on grounds that it was (1) Not addressed on a direct appeal, 
(2) That it was time-barred. Appellant filed Notice of Appeal 
with the Third District Court on January 12th, 1993. 
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importantly the knowledge of legal process in which to present 
the issues to the courts, and whether the petitioner is physically 
or mentally able to present the issues. Except for the provisions 
of section 78-12-31.1, appellants would have a right, which is 
mandated by both Constitutions, to enforce their remedy under 
known and accepted concepts of law. 
Article I section 11 of the Utah Constitution (Hereafter 
as section 11) is part of the Declaration of Rights. It declares 
that an individual shall have a right to a "remedy by due course 
of law" for injury to one's "person, property, or reputation." 
Specifically, that section states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this state, 
by himself or counsel any civil cause to which 
is a party. 
Thirty-seven states have constitutional provisions that 
are essentially similar to the Utah provision. These provisions, 
which have no analogue in the federal Constitution, and the 
better-known due process clauses found in both state and federal 
constitutions appear to have originated with the Magna Carta 
and "Sir Edwards Coke's Gloss on Chapter 29 of the 1297 Magna 
Carta [which] is remarkably similar to these remedy provisions." 
Provision such as section 11 have been referred to as "open 
courts" clauses and remedy clauses. In fact, section 11 was 
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designed to accomplish several purposes. The clear language 
of the section guarantees access to the courts and a judicial 
procedure that is based on fairness and equality. See Generally 
Celebrity Clubf Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 
1293f 1296 (1982); Industrial Commission v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 
409, 174 P. 825, 829 (1918). A plain reading of section 11 also 
established that the framers of the Constitution intended that 
an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of effective 
remedies designed to protect basic individual rights. A 
constitutional guarantee of access to the courthouse was not 
intended by the founders to be an empty gesture; individual are 
also entitled to "due course of law " for injuries to "person, 
property, or reputation." 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in referring to the history 
of that's state's similarly worded open court provision stated 
that it was intended to secure adequate remedies for violated 
rights. The court stated: 
The concept of allowing a reasonable period 
of time for suit to be brought after the cause 
of action arises is not new in our law, for 
along with "substantive rights, the first 
settlers brought over the individual, rights 
of adequate remedy and convenient procedure"; 
State v. Saunders, 66 N.H. 39, 74, 25A. 588, 
589 (1889). Thus, the "right to an adequate 
remedy [exists] for the infringement of a right 
derived from the unwritten law." Id, 25A. at 
589. When it came time to establish a post-
revolution form of government, the first part 
of our Constitution [which included an open 
courts provision] was devoted to chronicling 
our inherent rights. 
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Defining the scope of the constitutional protection that 
section 11 affords individual substantive rights is a task of 
the utmost delicacy and requires a careful consideration of others 
important, and sometimes competing, constitutional interest. 
The meaning of section 11 must be taken not only from its history 
and plain language, but also from its functional relationship 
to other constitutional provisions. Section 11 and Due Process 
clause of article I, section 7, of the Utah Constitution, are 
related both in their historical origins and to some extent in 
their constitutional functions. To a degree, the two provisions 
are not wholly duplicative. Both act to restrict the powers 
of both the courts and the legislature. See generally Masich 
v. United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., 113 Utah 
101, 191 P.2d 612, 623-24, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 (1948). 
The law in this state, as it is elsewhere, is that "no one 
has a vested right in any rule of law" under either the open 
courts or the due process provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
Specifically, neither the due process nor the open court 
provision constitutionalizes the common law or otherwise freezes 
the law governing private rights and remedies as of the time 
of statehood. Nevertheless, the Legislature does not have the 
power to abolish all the rights of action for injuries to one's 
person. In Masich, supra,113 Utah at 124, 191 P.2d at 624, the 
court stated "that if the Legislature were to abolish all 
negligence actions against employers and provide no substitute 
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remedy, the act would be unconstitutional.11 To some extent, 
therefore, the common law at the time of statehood provides at 
least a measure of the kinds of legal rights that the framers 
must have had in mind for the protection of life, property, and 
reputation. One of the important functions of the legislature 
to change and modify the law that governs relations between 
individuals as society evolves and conditions require. However, 
once a cause of action under a particular rule of law accrues 
to a person by virtue of an injury to his rights, that person's 
interest in the cause of action and the law which is basis for 
a legal action becomes vested, and a legislative repel of the 
law cannot constitutionally divest the injured person of the 
right to litigate the cause of action to a judgment. 
Necessarily the legislature has great latitude in defining, 
changing, and modernizing the law, and in doing so may create 
new rules of law and abrogate old ones. Nevertheless, the basic 
purpose of Article I, section 11 is to impose some limitation 
on that power for the benefit of those persons who are injured 
in their persons, property, or reputations are generally isolated 
in society, belong to no identifiable group, and rarely are able 
to rally the political process to their aid. 
The Appellant's contention that section 11 is only a 
"philosophical statement" that imposes no limitations on 
legislative power is unacceptable. If the legislative prerogative 
were always paramount, and the legislature could abolish any 
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or all remedies for injuries done to a patron, his property, 
or reputation, section 11 would be a useless appendage to the 
Constitution. The very assertion that section 11 is only a 
"philosophical statement" is necessarily inconsistent with the 
premise of a written constitution which was intended to be, and 
is, a statement of positive law that limits the powers of 
government. Article I, section 26 rivets section 11, and all 
other rights in the Declaration of Rights, (Utah) into the 
fundamental law of the State, and makes them enforceable in a 
court of law. Article I, section 26 declares that "the provisions 
of this constitution are mandatory and prohibitory unless by 
express word they are declared to be otherwise". The rights 
protected by section 11 are not declared to be other than 
"mandatory and prohibitory". Additionally, in further 
examination, Article I, section 27 states that "frequent 
recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security 
of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government". 
The South Dakota Supreme Court stated to this view in Daugaard 
v. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply Ass'n, S.D., 349 N.W. 2d 
419, 425 (1984): 
Our constitution... is solid core upon which 
all our state laws must be premised. Clearly 
and unequivocably, our constitution directs 
that the courts of this state shall be open 
to the injured and oppressed. We are unable 
to view this constitutional mandate as a faint 
echo to be skirted or ignored. Our constitution 
is free to provide greater protections for our 
citizens than are required under the federal 
constitution... Our constitution has spoken, 
and it is our duty to listen. 
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If the court relied on the general principle that one of 
the functions of the legislative power is to remedy defects in 
the common law as they develop, and to adapt to the change of 
time and circumstance, and the court also relied heavily on the 
usual deference that courts accord legislative enactments by 
a way of presumption of constitutionality, they might be able 
to agree with and affirm those principles as general propositions 
but should not agree that a proper constitutional analysis of 
section 11 can be made on those principles alone. The courts 
are simply not at liberty to eviscerate a mandatory provision 
of our Declaration of Rights by limiting their analysis to those 
principles alone. That kind of analysis would result in the 
legislative powers prevailing in every case, and would deprive 
the constitutional rights embraced in section 11 of any meaningful 
content or force. If the courts are free to refuse to give 
substance and meaning to section 11 because in stands in tension 
with the power of the legislature to adjust conflicting interests 
and values in society, we could as well emasculate every provision 
in the Declaration of Rights by the same method of analysis. 
The courts should decline to do this. 
The statute, section 78-12-31.1 according to the Appellee, 
merely defines the time during which a cause of action exists. 
By definition, then, when that time expires, no cause of action 
exists, and none is therefore abrogated. The injured party simply 
has no cause of action, and the injury done him is damnum absque 
injuria. 
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The courts should reject this view because it begs the 
question. The question, in view, is whether there is a remedy 
by due course of law, and that question is not answered by arguing 
that a cause of action is not abrogated but is only defined to 
be temporally limited. In short, the constitutional, protection 
cannot be evaded by the semantic argument that a cause of action 
is not cut off but only defined to exist for a specified period 
of time. 
To a degree, the open court provision is an extension of 
the due process clause. Indeed the open courts provision and 
the due process clause also have an overlapping function, to 
some extent, with respect to the abrogation of cause of action. 
If the Legislature were to abolish all causes of action for 
injuries to one's person or property, and provide no substitute 
equivalent remedy, there would be little doubt that that would 
violate section 11, and perhaps even the due process clause of 
Article I, section 7. In Masich v. United States Smelting and 
Refining Co., 113 Utah 101, 125, 191 P.2d 612, 624 (1948), The 
Court stated: 
Assuming the legislature can abolish the common 
law rights of action for negligence, must it 
return a substitute right to each and every 
employee in some way affected by the abrogation 
to meet the test of constitutionality? If the 
legislature were to abolish all compensation 
and all common law rights for negligence of 
an employer, no contention could reasonably 
be made that it was a proper exercise of the 
police power. The reverse would be true and 
pauperism with is concomitants of vice and crime 
would flourish. 
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Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Wilson v. 
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902), noted the fundamental obligation 
of government to provide reasonable remedies for wrongs done 
persons. 
Every government is under obligation to its 
citizens to afford them all needful legal 
remedies... A statute could not bar the existing 
rights of claimants without affording this 
opportunity [to try rights in the court]; if 
it should attempt to do so, it would not be 
a statute of limitation, but an unlawful attempt 
to extinguish rights arbitrily, whatever might 
be the purport of its provision." 
Id. at 62. 
The basic rule has been summarized in a leading treatise, 
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitations of Action, section 28: 
It is not within the power of the legislature, 
under the guise of a limitation provision, to 
cut off an existing remedy entirely, since this 
would amount to a denial of justice... 
In sum, section 11 does not recede before every legislative 
enactment, but neither may it be applied in a mechanical fashion 
to strike every statute with which there may be conflict. To 
hold every statute of limitation unconstitutional without regard 
to the legislative purpose could result in a legislative inability 
to cope with widespread social or economic evils. In the instant 
case, the Legislature has imposed less than a total abrogation 
of all remedies, since actions are barred only after a specified 
period of time has elapsed. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that section 11 of the 
Declaration of Rights and the prerogative of the legislature 
are properly accommodated by applying a two-part analysis. First 
section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person 
an effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by due course 
of law11 for vindication of his constitutional interest. The 
benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially equal 
in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing 
essentially comparable substantive protection to one's person, 
property, or reputation, although the form of the substitute 
remedy may be different. See generally Masich v. United States 
Smelting, Refining, and Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, 
624 (1948); See also New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 
188, 201 (1917), where the United States Supreme Court in dictum 
stated, "Among the historic liberties so protected was a right 
to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified 
intrusions on personal security." (Footnote omitted). In 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94 (1980), 
Justice Marshall, in a concurring opinion, suggested that a 
reasonable alternative remedy must be provided that when "core" 
common-law rights are abolished. 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy 
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be 
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to 
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be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy 
is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. 
For the reasons stated above, the court should hold that 
elimination of all causes of after the period specified in section 
78-12-31.1 of Utah Code Ann. is arbitraryf unreasonable, and 
will not achieve the statutory objective. 
POINT II 
SECTION 78-12-31.1 VIOLATES APPELLANT'S 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
Appellant is entitled to the due process guarantees of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States and Section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitution 
of Utah. The due process aspects of statutes of limitations 
was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in Wilson v. 
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55; 22 S. Ct. 573 (1902). The court at page 
575 stated: 
...it may be properly conceded that all statutes 
of limitations must proceed on the idea that 
the party has full opportunity afforded him 
to try his right in the courts. A statute could 
not bar the existing rights of claimants without 
affording this opportunity; if it should attempt 
to do so, it would not be a statute of 
limitations, but an unlawful attempt to 
extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might 
be the purport of its provisions. It is 
essential that such statutes allow a reasonable 
time after they take effect for the commencement 
of suits upon existing causes of action... 
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Section 78-12-31,1 does not provide a "reasonable time" 
for the commencement of an action by a person who discovers the 
rights violations one day before the period endsf nor does it 
provide a reasonable time for the Appellants who may of had the 
cause of action conceal and discovers after the period has run. 
In fact the statute not only limits the time to bring an action, 
but also removes the remedy of parties such as your Appellant, 
Furthermore the statute in not a "limitations" statute, but is, 
in fact, a transparent grant of immunity intended to benefit 
one party of the cause of action, while excluding the other 
logical member of the same cause of action* The result is an 
unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, thereby 
violating the constitutional mandated protection of due process 
of law. 
POINT III 
THE EXISTING DISABILITIES MUST TOLL 
THE LIMITATIONS 
The main thrust of the Appellant's claims is that he was 
sentenced on unconstitutionally obtain and erroneous information. 
See U.S. v. Strayer, 846 F.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. 
Mueller,, 902 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1990). The causes are multiple, 
and include, but are not limited to the ones addressed to the 
courts. These causes have severely and quite effectively disabled 
the Appellant form obtaining equal protection and due process 
that is guaranteed to everyone under the law. (citing Article 
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I section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and the fifth and fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution). These disabilities 
were created and existed at the time of sentencing, and still 
exist to this day* See Utah Code Ann. 78-12-42. 
The concealment, which was perpetuated by the Trial Court 
was quite effective and would have remained so had not the 
Appellant been further prejudiced and penalized by the same 
inaccurate information at his Board of Pardons hearing, some 
II months after receiving his sentence from the Trial Court. 
See Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-203. 
The lack of effective assistance of counsel that accumulated 
at the time of sentencing and that is still persisting to this 
day, has effectively disabled the Appellant from properly and 
timely addressing the courts. See Article I section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution and Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
These are but two disabilities that the Trial Court both 
knew about, or participated in, and which could have, and should 
have, been eliminated by the Trial Court with proper intervention. 
Nonetheless, because these disabilities were allowed to continue 
the limitation must be toll in this cause of action. In examining 
Utah Code Ann. 78-12-43 which states: 
When two or more disabilities coexist at 
the time the right .of action accrues, the 
limitation does not attach until all are removed. 
Therefore pursuant to said statute, and because the Appellant 
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has been caused and made to suffer from not only the disabilities 
addressed above but multiple disabilities, the limitation must 
be tolled in this case at bar. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT MUST FOLLOW PROCEDURES. 
1• The court can not avail itself the statute of limitations. 
When the Trial Court ordered and did received a presentencing 
report to be utilized in determining the applied sentence, should 
not have there been disclosure to all parties involved. See 
U.S. v. Miller, 849,F.2d 896, 898 (4th Cir. 1988); also see Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-203 which states in 
part: 
... full disclosure of the presentence 
investigation report shall be made to defense 
counsel, the defendant and to the prosecutor... 
The presentencing report shall also be made 
available to prosecutors, defense counsel and 
the defendant at the court on the date of 
sentencing... 
This was not done in the Appellant's case, and in fact the 
Appellant did not receive constructive notice that a report did 
indeed exist until November of 1991. The Utah Supreme Court 
has long held that there must be disclosure of the report. See 
State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (1980); State v. Casarez, 
656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115,118 
(Utah 1985); all which state in part: 
Fundamental fairness requires that the 
Trial Court disclose to a criminal defendant 
his presentence report prior to sentencing in 
order to better insure that the Trial Court's 
sentencing discretion is based on accurate 
information. 
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Fraudulent concealment is defined as "the hiding or 
suppression of material fact or circumstance which the party 
is legally of morally bound to disclose..." See Black's Law 
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Based upon this definition then, 
the court did perpetrate an act of fraudulent concealment. Also 
because of this prejudicial error by the court, this Court, should 
bar the Trial Court from urging a statute of limitations judgment. 
This basic principle announced in Rucker v. Ward, 131 Neb. 25, 
267 N.W. 191 (1936) which states: 
One who wrongfully conceals a material 
fact necessary to the accrual of a cause of 
action against him, and such concealment causes 
the opposite party to delay the filing of the 
suit cannot avail himself of the statute of 
limitation as a defense. 
The doctrine of contra non valentem is, in part, but an 
application of the long-established principle of law that one 
should not be able to take advantage of his own wrongful act. 
2. The court incorrectly dismissed the writ. 
In and after examination of the Appellant's fourth claim 
stated in his original petition, the Trial Court dismissed the 
claim, not on procedural grounds, but on review of the issue 
and evidence gathered to determine the factual verity, did dismiss 
the claim on grounds of being incorrect. Because the claim was 
dismissed on its merit, the Appellant who was not present, should 
have been according to procedures outlined in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. See Stinnett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 148, 
434 P.2d 753 (1967). Also see Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, 65B (b)(10), which states in part: 
The petitioner shall be present before 
the court at hearings on dispositive issues... 
On examination of the definition of the word "shall" 
contained in Black's Law Dictionary, (6th ed. 1990). We find 
th&t it's defined as meaning "must" and is inconsistent with 
a concept of discretion. Therefore the presents of the Appellant 
before the Trial Court was mandatory. 
Of the remaining three claims contained in the Appellant's 
original petition, these were incorrectly dismissed. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that, "a conviction or sentence that has 
not yet been fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior 
Habeas Corpus proceeding should not be denied re-examination 
because of a procedural defualt." See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 
1029, 1036 (Utah 1989); Id. at 1036. Because the petition was 
dismissed solely on procedural grounds, and the Trial Court did 
not consider the substantive merit of the Appellant's allegations, 
the dismissal was incorrect. The Appellant should have the right 
to litigate the cause of action to a judgment. 
B. MUST BE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Defense counsel's conduct fell below reasonable standards 
of performance. Defense attorneys have the obligation to protect 
the rights to proper sentencing hearing. See Wilson v. U.S., 
962 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1992). The Trial Court was aware of 
a conflict of interest that existed between counsel and Appellant. 
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This was made apparent by verbal reports given by both parties 
to the court. The court abused its discretion in letting this 
appointment stand after these facts came to light during court 
proceedings and the Appellant was prejudice by this lack of 
effective representation. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 
"The Defense Function11 Standard 4-3 (Defense attorneys are 
obligated to follow proper procedures, and present appropriate 
motions and objections to protect the rights of their clients). 
Trial counsel should have challenged the non-disclosure of the 
presentencing report, and informed the court that the Appellant 
had not had the opportunity to review the report prior to 
sentencing being imposed. 
Because of the Appellant's lack of understanding legal 
procedures at the time, he relied totally in good faith in the 
court appointed attorney. Counsel never met with the Appellant 
at any time other than for the short time that he was standing 
in front of the court for proceedings. Counsel did not talk 
with him prior to sentence being imposed or inform Appellant 
that a presentencing report had been submitted to the court. 
After the sentence was imposed, counsel did not meet or talk 
with the Appellant to discuss the consequences of the judgment 
against him, or inform him of any meritorious grounds for an 
appeal or the right to an appeal. See Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, Rule 4-604. 
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The Appellant did not knowingly or voluntarily waive the 
right to appeal. To fairly and properly waive a right to a 
particular matter, should not the person know (1) that the right 
exist, (2) the full and total consequences of such a waiver. 
The Appellant did not know that there was either, the right of 
appeal, or that an appealable issue existed. Because counsel 
did not explain the proceeding to the Appellant at the time, 
when there was mention of an appeal by the Trial Court during 
the sentencing hearing, the Appellant thought that the Trial 
Court had forgotten that some months earlier when the plea was 
entered, the court informed the Appellant that he was giving 
up the right to an appeal by changing his plea. The Appellant 
presumed this to be any and all appeals and was part of the 
conditions of the plea-bargain. 
This goes to the very heart of the contention that the 
Appellant was made to and prejudice from the disability of not 
having effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Also see Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
Furthermore, because of the acts perpetuated by the Trial 
counsel of not returning or convening with the Appellant before 
of after sentencing, also after numerous requests were made, 
both by himself, and his spouse, that were totally ignored by 
counsel, the Appellant did not have 30 seconds, let alone 30 
days to request his counsel to pursue an appeal. See generally 
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981). 
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Additionally, the Appellant should not be punished for his 
attorney's failure in her performance which fell below objective 
standards of reasonable performance, and this Court may reach 
the merits of this issue and correct the error under the auspices 
of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. See 
Strickland, ABA Standards, supra. 
Alternatively, this Court should affirm and utilize the 
standard of "unusual circumstance" contemplated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in both Brown v. Tunner, 440 P.2d 968 (Utah 1968); 
and Rammel v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1979). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing this Court should reverse the lower 
court's order and remand the petition back for further and proper 
proceedings consistent with its ruling. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ H day of March, 1993. 
DAVID LEE HEWITT 
Appearing Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, David Lee Hewitt, hereby certifies that 
he mailed eight copies of the forgoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals and two copies of the forgoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 330 South 300 East, 2nd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this %\**> day of March, 1993. 
David Lee Hewitt 
APPENDIX 1 
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
CONSTITUTION OP UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHT 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
requires it. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting, or defending before any tribunal in this State, 
by himself or counsel,any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Sec. 12. Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal 
in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provision of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurence to fundamental principles is essential to 
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government. 
AMENDMENTS AND ARTICLE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning -
Due process of law and just compensation clauses ] 
No preson shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the law. 
ARTICLE I. 
Sec. 9. [Powers denied Congress.] 
[2.] The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the 
public safety may require it. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
77-18a-1(b). Appeals - When proper. 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial 
rights of the defendant; 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs 
sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other 
criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge 
to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital 
felony; 
78-12-31.1. Habeas corpus - Three months. 
Within three months; 
For relief pursant to a writ of habeas corpus. This 
limitation shall apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner 
but also to grounds which in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner 
78-12-42. Disability must exist when right of action accrues. 
No person can avail himself of a disability, unless it existed 
when his right of action accrued. 
78-12-43. All disabilities must be removed. 
When two or more disabilities coexist at the time the right 
of action accores, the limitation does not attach until all are 
removed. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 65B (b) (10) 
RULE 65B Extraordinary relief. 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment. 
(10) Hearings: After pleadings are closed, the court shall 
promptly set the proceedings for a hearing or otherwise dispose 
of the case. Upon motion for good cause, the court may grant 
leave to either party to take discovery or to extend the date 
for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, thn court may order either 
the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing 
conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. The 
petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in the court 
during the proceeding. 
UTAH RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
Rule 4-203. Presentence investigation reports. 
Intent: 
To provide uniformity in the distribution of presentence 
investigation reports. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all appellate, district, juvenile, 
circuit and justice courts, the Department of Corrrections, state 
prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Presentence investigation reports shall be completed by 
order of the court as provided in Utah Code Ann. Section 77-18-
1 and 64-13-20* Presentence reports are classified as confidential 
and shall not be available to the public. The documents shall 
either be physically removed from the case file and kept in a 
separate storage area, retained in the case file in a sealed 
envelope marked "Confidential," or destoryed after sentencing. 
(2) Full disclosure of the presentence investigation report 
shall be made to defense counsel, the defendent and to the 
prosecutor unless disclosure of the presentence report would 
jeopardize the life or safety of third parties. The presentence 
investigation report shall be made available to prosecutors, 
defense counsel and the defendent two days in advance of 
sentencing at the local office of the Department of Corrections 
or such other location as ordered by the court. The presentence 
report shall also be made available to prosecutors, defense 
counsel and the defendant at the court on the date of sentencing. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Rule 4-604. Withdrawal of counsel in criminal cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for withdrawal of counsel 
in criminal cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and not 
of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Withdrawal of counsel prior to entry of judgment. 
(A) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an 
attorney may withdrawal as counsel of record in criminal cases 
except where withdrawal may result in a delay of the trial or 
prejudice to the client. In those cases, an attorney may not 
withdrawal without the approval of the court. 
(B) A motion to withdrawal as an attorney in a criminal 
case shall be made in open court with the defendant present unless 
otherwise ordered by the court. 
(2) Withdrawal of counsel after entry of judgment. 
Prior to permitting withdrawal of trial counsel, the trial court 
shall require counsel to file a written statement certifying: 
(A) That the defendant has been advised of his right to 
file a motion for a new trial or to seek a certificate of probable 
cause, and if in counsel's opinion such action is appropriate 
that the same has been filed, 
(B) That the defendant has been advised of his right to 
appeal and if in counsel's opinion such action is appropriate, 
that a Notice of Appeal, a Request for Transcript, and in 
appropriate cases, an Affidavit of Impecuniosity and an Order 
requiring the appropriate county to bear the cost of preparing 
the transcript have been filed. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
